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1 Introduction
The dynamics of redistributive taxation has received a great deal of interest
among theorists. Quite often, the government is modelled as a Stackelberg
leader that announces a time path of tax rates, and other economic agents
such as workers and capitalists are modelled as followers that maximize their
intertemporal utility, taking the announced time path of tax rates as given.
One criticism that has been raised against this approach is that the gov-
ernment's solution is generally time-inconsistent. This criticism has turned
out to be somewhat exaggerated, because recently it has been discovered
that, depending on the specic structure of the model under consideration,
an open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium may have the desired time-consistency
property
1
. Another criticism of some analysis of open-loop Stackelberg redis-
tributive taxation game is that the stability of steady-state equilibria is often
assumed. Kemp, Long, and Shimomura (1993) have shown that around a
steady state there may exist cycles, and cyclical redistributive taxation may
be optimal.
In this paper, we raise a third point concerning the standard analysis
of models of redistributive taxation. It is about the assumption that at a
steady-state equilibrium of a redistributive game, all quantity variables and
all shadow prices are stationary. This assumption has led to the claim that
at a steady-state equilibrium, the tax rate on capital income must be zero,
regardless of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (see, for example,
Judd (1985)). Our paper oers a counter-example which shows that (i) a
steady-state equilibrium (in quantities) exists while the shadow prices are
not stationary (we call this a \semi-stationary" state), (ii) at this steady-
state equilibrium, the tax rate on capital income is non-zero, and (iii) in
our example, there is no other steady-state equilibrium in quantities. Our
counter-example, valid for open economies as well as closed economies, is im-
portant because it indicates that the standard short-cut of setting all equa-
tions of motions to zero can lead to incorrect conclusion about optimal tax
in a steady state.
1
See Xie (1997). The basic point in Xie's article is that a so-called \transversality
condition" at the initial time of the control problem of the Stackelberg leader may turn
out not to be a necessary condition, as was commonly claimed. For a more detailed
discussion of this point, see Dockner, Jrgensen, Long, and Sorger (1999, Chapter 5), who
also provide examples of the non-applicability of such \transversality conditions" in nite
horizon and innite horizon open-loop Stackelberg games.
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The plan of our paper is as follows. In Section 2, we consider a model of
redistributive taxation in a closed economy, and prove our basic results. In
Section 3, we show that our arguments apply also to open economies. An
alternative formulation of the redistributive game is presented in Section 4,
where it is shown that the same results are obtained. Section 5 provides
an intuitive explanation of our results. Some concluding remarks are oered
in Section 6. The appendices settle some technical issues. In particular,
Appendix C shows that our results are valid also when the model is set in
discrete time.
2 Redistributive Taxation in a Closed Econ-
omy
We consider a model introduced by Judd (1985) in which there exists a gov-
ernment, and two types of innitely-lived individuals, called workers and
capitalists respectively. Each worker supplies one unit of labour, indepen-
dently of the wage rate. They neither borrow nor lend: they consume all
their current income. Capitalists do not work. They own capital, which they
lend to competitive rms at the market interest rate r(t). There is no de-
preciation. Firms use capital and labour to produce a nal good which can
be either consumed or invested. Constant returns to scale is assumed, and
rms earn no prot. For notational simplicity, the number of each type of
individual is set at unity, without loss of generality.
The gross income earned by the representative capitalist is r(t)k(t) where
k(t)  0 is his stock of capital. His net income is [1  (t)]r(t)k(t) where  (t)
is the tax rate on capital income, and 1  (t)  0. Let c(t) denote his rate
of consumption, and let z(t) = [1   (t)]r(t). We assume that z(t)  0. His
stock of capital accumulates according to the equation
_
k(t) = z(t)k(t)   c(t) (1)
where
_
k(t) is positive [respectively, negative] if consumption is less than [re-
spectively, exceeds] net income. The capitalist has the utility function u(c)
which is increasing and strictly concave. We also assume that lim
c!0
u
0
(c) =
1 and lim
c!1
u
0
(0) = 0. These assumptions ensure that it is never optimal
to set c = 0. The capitalist takes the time path of r(t) and (t) as given,
and his optimization problem is to choose a time path c(t) to maximize the
2
integral of his stream of discounted utility
Z
1
0
e
 t
u(c(t))dt
subject to (1) and k(0) = k
0
> 0 (given), where  > 0 is the rate at which
utility is discounted. It is also understood that if k(t) = 0 then c(t) = 0. We
impose either the constraint that, for all t
k(t)  0 (2)
or the constraint that
lim
t!1
k(t) exp

Z
t
t
0
 z( )d

= 0: (3)
The capitailist thus faces an optimal control problem
2
. Under our assumption
about u(c), it is well known that if  (t) < 1 and r(t) > 0 then k(t) will always
be positive along the optimal path.
Before solving the above problem, it is useful to point out that instead of
(1) and (2) we may write the following intertemporal budget constraint
Z
1
t
0
c(t) exp

Z
t
t
0
 z( )d

dt = k(t
0
) (4)
where t
0
= 0, but clearly t
0
can be any point of time. Note that we can
integrate (1) to get
lim
t!1
k(t) exp

Z
t
t
0
 z( )d

  k(t
0
) =   lim
t!1
Z
t
t
0
c(s) exp

Z
s
t
0
 z( )d

ds (5)
so (1) and (3) imply (4). Conversely, one can show that (4) implies (1) and
(3).
2.1 The capitalist's consumption decision
The Hamiltonian for the capitalist's optimization problem is
H
c
= u(c) +  [zk   c] (6)
2
See, for example, Leonard and Long (1992).
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From this we obtain the necessary conditions
@H
c
@c
= u
0
(c)   = 0 (7)
_
 =   
@H
c
@k
=  (  z) (8)
_
k =
@H
c
@ 
= zk   c (9)
and the transversality condition is
lim
t!1
e
 t
u
0
(c(t))k(t) = 0: (10)
Dierentiating (7) with respect to t we get
u
00
(c) _c =
_
 =  (  z) = u
0
(c)(  z)
Therefore conditions (7) and (8) can be combined into a single condition
_c =
c
(c)
(z   ) (11)
where by denition (c) =  u
00
(c)c=u
0
(c) > 0 is the elasticity of marginal
utility. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution is dened as 1=(c). In
what follows, we assume that (c) is a constant, denoted by .
Remark 1:
Under the assumption that  is a constant, we can integrate (11) to get
c(t) = c(t
0
) exp


 1
Z
t
t
0
(z( )  )d

(12)
Substituting (12) into (4), we get
c(t
0
) =
k(t
0
)
R
1
t
0
expf
R

t
0
[z(s)(
 1
  1)  (=)]dsgd
(13)
Thus current consumption depends on future tax rates if  6= 1. However, if
 = 1, which is the case of a logarithmic utility function, then (13) becomes
c(t
0
) = k(t
0
): (14)
4
2.2 The government's optimization problem
Under competitive conditions and given the assumption that there is no
depreciation, the interest rate is the same as the marginal product of capital,
f
0
(k). The wage rate is w(t) = f(k)  r(t)k(t).
The government's role is assumed to be purely redistributive: the capital
income tax revenue (t)r(t)k(t) is given to the representative worker, who
consumes both (t)r(t)k(t) and his wage income w(t). Since
 (t)r(r)k(t) = r(t)k(t)  z(t)k(t) = [f(k(t))  w(t)]  z(t)k(t)
the consumption of the representative worker is
c
w
(t) = f(k(t))  z(t)k(t): (15)
The utility of the worker is v(c
w
) where v(:) is strictly concave and increasing.
The government takes the pair of dierential equations (9) and (11), to-
gether with the initial condition k(0) = k
0
and the transversality condition
(10), as representing the representative capitalist's \reaction function" to
the government's announced time path z(t). The government's optimization
problem consists of choosing a time path z(t) to maximize the integral of
discounted ow of the weighted sum of utility v(c
w
(t)) + u(c(t)) :
max
Z
1
0
e
 t
fv(c
w
(t)) + u(c(t))gdt (16)
subject to (15) and
_
k(t) = z(t)k(t)   c(t) (17)
_c(t) =
c(t)

fz(t)  g (18)
k(0) = k
0
(19)
lim
t!1
e
 t
u
0
(c(t))k(t) = 0 (20)
where  > 0 is the weight given to the utility of the worker.
Notice that in this formulation, the capital stock is not the only state
variable: we treat c as a state variable, too. (This is the standard approach,
5
see Judd (1985), Kemp, Long and Shimomura (1993), among others.) The
Hamiltonian for this problem is
H = v(f(k)  zk) + u(c) + p[zk   c] + qc
"
z   

#
(21)
and the necessary conditions are
@H
@z
=  kv
0
+ pk + qc= = 0 (22)
_p = p 
@H
@k
= p  zp  (f
0
  z)v
0
(23)
_q = q  
@H
@c
= q   q
"
z   

#
  u
0
(c) + p (24)
together with (17), (18), (19), (20), and the transversality conditions
lim
t!1
e
 t
pk = lim
t!1
e
 t
qc = 0 (25)
2.3 The optimal capital income tax rate
We want to nd the optimal capital income tax rate in a steady state, dened
as the situation where the state variables remain constant for ever, i.e. _c =
_
k = 0 for all t. Suppose we follows the standard procedure of nding a steady
state by equating to zero the time derivatives of all the state variables and all
the associated shadow prices. The steady state condition _c = 0 implies z = 
in the steady state. Using this result to simplify (23) and then equating _p to
zero gives us f
0
= z. But f
0
= r, therefore z = r, implying that in a steady
state where the time derivatives of all shadow prices are equated to zero,
the tax rate on capital income is zero, and the steady state capital stock k

satises the modied golden rule property
f
0
(k

) = : (26)
Since
_
k = 0, c

= k

. Substitute this into (22) to get
k

[p

+ (q

=)  v
0
(f(k

)  k

)] = 0 (27)
Since we have set _p = 0, equation (27) holds at a steady state only if _q = 0,
too.This in turn implies, via (24), that
q

+ p

= u
0
(k

) (28)
6
Since k

has been determined by (26), the two equations (27) and (28) deter-
mine the pair (q

; p

). It can be easily veried that q

satises the following
condition:
u
0
(k

)  v
0
(f(k

)  k

) = q

"
1

  1
#
(29)
This indicates that the gap between the two weighted marginal utilities is
generally non-zero.
It is tempting to conclude that in this model, at the optimal steady state,
the optimal tax rate on capital income is zero. However, such a conclusion
seems to be too hasty. Let us consider the case where the utility function
u(:) is logarithmic: u(c) = ln c. In this case,  = 1, and u
0
(k

) = 1=(k

);
hence we can substitute (28) into (27) to get
k

f[1=(k

)]  v
0
(f(k

)  k

)g = 0 (30)
In general it is not possible for k

to satisfy both this equation and equation
(26). It follows that if u(c) = ln c then a steady state where all shadow prices
are stationary does not exist (generically). This is not a negative result,
however, for, as will be shown below, there exists a steady state (
^
k; c^) where
all state variables are stationary while the shadow prices are not stationary.
At this steady state, however, the capital stock
^
k does not satisfy the modied
golden rule (26) and the optimal tax on capital income is non-zero.
First, setting _c = 0, we get
z =  (31)
Next, setting
_
k = 0, we get
c^ = 
^
k (32)
Substituting these results into (22), with  = 1, we get
^
k[p(t) + q(t)  v
0
(f(
^
k)  
^
k)] = 0 (33)
Since we seek a
^
k which is positive and stationary, (33) implies
p(t) + q(t) = v
0
[f(
^
k)  
^
k] (34)
and it follows that _p(t)+  _q(t) = 0. Multipling equation (24) by , adding it
to equation (23), and equating the result to zero, we get
_p(t) +  _q(t) = [2  f
0
(
^
k)]v
0
(f(
^
k)  
^
k)  (1=
^
k) = 0 (35)
7
This equation determines
^
k.
To summarize, when the utility function u(c) is logarithmic, there exists
a steady state pair (
^
k; c^) with non-stationary shadow prices (p(t); q(t)) where
^
k is determined by
[2  f
0
(
^
k)]v
0
[f(
^
k)  
^
k]  (1=
^
k) = 0 (36)
and c^ = 
^
k, while p(t) + q(t) is given by (34). (If the system begins at
(
^
k; c^) then it will remain there, while the shadow prices will be changing
continuously, with p(t) = p(0)   [f
0
(
^
k)   ]v
0
[f(
^
k)   
^
k]t, where p(0) is
arbitrary.) Note that equation (36) can be written as:
u
0
(
^
k)  v
0
[f(
^
k)  
^
k] =
1

h
  f
0
(
^
k)
i
v
0
[f(
^
k)  
^
k] (37)
This shows that the gap between the two weighted marginal utilities is gen-
erally non-zero. It is positive if and only if f
0
(
^
k) < .
When the utility function u(c) is logarithmic, the optimal tax on capital
in the steady state is
^ = f
0
(
^
k)  z = f
0
(
^
k)   =  
1

^
kv
0
[f(
^
k)  
^
k]
(38)
which can be positive or negative. From (38) and (37), ^ is negative if and
only if u
0
(
^
k) exceeds v
0
[f(
^
k)  
^
k].
3 Redistributive Taxation in an Open Econ-
omy
In this section, we seek to show that the basic results of the preceding section
also applies to open economies. To do this in the simplest way, we consider
a small open economy producing two goods: good 1, which is an investment
good, and good 2, which is a consumption good. Their outputs are denoted
by X
1
and X
2
respectively. The production functions are
X
i
= F
i
(K
i
; L
i
); i = 1; 2
where each F
i
(K
i
; L
i
) is homogenous of degree one, strictly quasi-concave,
and increasing in each argument. To x ideas, assume that good 1 is labor
8
intensive, though this is not essential for our argument. Let  denote the
(time-independent) price of the consumption good in terms of the investment
good, which serves as the numeraire. The small open economy takes  as
exogenously given. Perfect competition is assumed to prevail in the product
markets and factor markets.
It is well known that the above assumptions allow us to obtain the GNP
function
y = g(k; )
where y is aggregate output in terms of the numeraire good, and k(t) is the
economy's stock of capital per worker. Let us list below the properties of the
function g(k; ). Given , there exist two positive numbers k
A
() and k
B
();
where k
A
() < k
B
(); such that (i) if k  k
A
(), then the economy specializes
in the production of good 1, and g(k; ) = f
1
(k); (ii) if k  k
B
(), then the
economy specializes in the production of good 2, and g(k; ) = f
2
(k); (iii) if
k
A
() < k < k
B
(), then the economy produces both goods, and aggregate
output is
g(k; ) = f
1
(k
A
()) + (k   k
A
())f
0
1
(k
A
())
Over the range of diversication described in (iii), the marginal product of
capital is constant, and given by:
@g
@k
= f
0
1
(k
A
()):
In what follows, since  is assumed to be constant, we will suppress the
dependence of y on  and write f(k) as a short-hand expression for g(k; ):
Note that the function f(k) is continuous, increasing, and concave, with strict
concavity holding for k  k
A
(), and for k  k
B
(). For k
A
() < k < k
B
(),
the function f(k) is linear.
It is clear that the model and the analysis in section 2 can be adapted to
our open economy. The minor changes that must be made are listed below.
1. The accumulation equation (1) becomes
_
k(t) = [1   (t)]r(t)k(t)  c(t) (39)
2. The Hamiltonian (6) becomes
H
c
= u(c) +  [zk   c] (40)
9
3. The consumption of the representative worker, instead of being (15), is
now
c
w
(t) = [f(k(t))  z(t)k(t)]
 1
: (41)
It follows that the equations (16) to (38) must be modied, but only with
minimal changes. The essential results of section 2 carry over to the small
open economy.
4 An Alternative Approach
In the preceding section we showed that when the capitalist's utility function
is u(c) = ln c, then a steady state with stationary shadow prices (in addition
to stationary state variables) does not exist (generically), and that there
exists a steady state with non-stationary shadow prices. At this steady state,
the optimal tax on capital is non-zero. In deriving those conclusions, we have
made used of the standard formulation of the government's optimization
problem: we have introduced c(t) as an additional state variable. In the
present section, we show that the same results can be obtained using an
alternative formulation.This approach consists of representing the capitalist's
optimal consumption rule in a close form, which is possible when u(c) = ln c.
Instead of representing the capitalist's optimal paths by the pair of dif-
ferential equations (9) and (11), we note that in the case  = 1 (i.e., utility
is logarithmic), using (3), we can represent these paths by the following pair
of equations:
c(t) = k(t) (42)
and
_
k(t) = z(t)k(t)  k(t) (43)
(In fact, this was shown in Remark 1 of subsection 2.1. Note also that if we
dierentiate (42) with respect to t, we get
_c(t) = 
_
k(t) = [z(t)k(t)   k(t)] = [z(t)k(t)   c(t)]
which is (11) with  = 1.)
The representation (42)-(43) highlights the fact that when  = 1, the
capitalist's current consumption c(t) depends only on his current capital
stock k(t); and is independent of current and future tax rates. His current
10
saving, z(t)k(t)  c(t), does depends on the current tax rate.This fact is only
implicit in the representation using (9) and (11).
Remark 2: If we do not use (3), we still can get the same result. With
 = 1, we get from ((9)),
z(t) = +
_c(t)
c(t)
hence (11) yields
_
k(t)
k(t)
=  
_c(t)
c(t)
+
c(t)
k(t)
Dene (t) = k(t)=c(t). Then
_
(t)
(t)
=  
1
(t)
(44)
This equation, and the condition
lim
t!
(t)e
 t
= 0 (45)
which is obtained from (10), give (t) =  as the only solution that satises
(45).
Using (42)-(43), the optimization problem of the government can be re-
written as
max
Z
1
0
e
 t
fv[f(k(t))  z(t)k(t)] + ln(k(t))gdt
subject to (43) and k(0) = k
0
.
The Hamiltonian is
~
H = v[f(k(t))  z(t)k(t)] + ln(k(t)) +  [z(t)k(t)  k(t)] (46)
and the rst order conditions are (43)
@
~
H
@z
=  kv
0
+  k = 0 (47)
and
_
 =   
@
~
H
@k
= z  
1
k
  [f
0
(k)  z]v
0
(48)
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At a steady state with
_
k =
_
 = 0, we have
z = 
and
2  f
0
(k) =
1
kv
0
(49)
Equation (49) is identical to (35). It follows that the steady state of this
problem is identical to that given by (35).
The approach taken in this section, while conrming our results found in
the preceding section, has several advantages: (i) simplicity, (ii) suciency is
ensured because the maximized Hamiltonian is concave in the state variable
3
,
and (iii) it is transparent that the solution is time-consistent.
5 An Intuitive Explanation
While the main purpose of this paper is to show that, in some model formula-
tions, the unique steady state in quantities can be obtained only by allowing
shadow prices to be non-stationary, we feel that it may be useful to provide
some economic explanation. Why is it that, if the representative capitalist's
utility function is logarithmic ( = 1), the optimal tax on capital income in
the steady state is non-zero, while if their utility function has an elasticity
of marginal utility  6= 1, the optimal tax is zero in the steady state?
The reason is that if  = 1 (i.e., if the representative capitalist has a
logarithmic utility function), then the income eect and the substitution
eect (on his current consumption) of a change in capital income tax cancel
each other out, and his optimal current consumption
4
is simply a(t) where
a(t) denotes the current level of his wealth (which, in our model, is the
same as his capital stock k(t)). This means that c(t) and k(t) cannot be
3
See the Appendix.
4
The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for the capitalist's optimization problem is
V (t; a)  V
t
(t; a) = maxfln c+ V
a
(t; a)[z(t)a  c]g
and it can be veried that the function
V (t; a) =
Z
1
t

e
 (s t)
Z
s
t
[z()  ]d

ds+
ln(a)

satises the above functional equation and that the optimal control rule is c(t) = a(t).
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separated by the only policy instrument that we assume is available to the
government, i.e,. the time path of the tax rate  (:). The government can use
this policy instrument to inuence the time path k(:); but it cannot break the
relationship c(t) = k(t). If  6= 1, the situation is quite dierent: there is no
such xed, tax-independent relationship
5
. Thus, if  = 1, the government is
much handicapped, and it is no longer optimal to try to achieve the golden
rule f
0
(k) =  in the long run.
The above explanation raises an interesting question: given  = 1, what
additional policy instrument would ensure that the optimal redistributive
taxation implies a zero tax rate on capital income in the steady state? The
key to the answer is that the nexus c = k must be broken. And this can
be done if another asset is introduced into the economy, say government
bonds, denoted by b.(If b is negative, this means the government is the net
creditor.) For then, the representative capitalist's wealth, denoted by a, is
the sum of k and b, and his optimal consumption rule is c(t) = [k(t)+ b(t)],
and it is no longer true that c(t) = k(t): It is shown in the Appendix that
with this additional policy instrument, in the long run the optimal tax on
capital income is zero, and the golden rule f
0
(k) =  is restored. (If b < 0
in the steady state, which is the case if  is suciently great, this means the
government in eect owns part of the capital stock, and the rental income
on that part is distributed to the workers).
6 Concluding Remarks
We have shown that it may be incorrect to characterize the properties of
a steady state by setting the motion of all shadow prices equal to zero.
Such a procedure can lead to policy recommendations that are unwarranted.
Using the standard representation of the representative capitalist's \reaction
function", we have also demonstrated that, in the case where the capitalist's
utility function is logarithmic, the optimal tax on capital income in a steady
state (with non-stationary shadow prices) is not zero, and there does not exist
a steady state with stationary shadow prices. The steady state we found can
5
Remark 1 in subsection 2.1 implies that, for all t,
c(t) =
a(t)
R
1
t
expf
R

t
z(s)(1=   1)  =dsgd
Thus current consumption depends on future tax rates if  6= 1.
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also be obtained using a closed form representation of the capitalist's optimal
consumption rule. Our results apply to both closed and open economies.
Another related issue in the taxation literature is whether government
policies, obtained by solving an optimal control problem, is time inconsis-
tent. Xie (1997) has shown that if the production function is linear in cap-
ital and the utility function is logarithmic, then the optimal tax path is
time-consistent. In our model, even though the production function is not
linear, the solution is also time-consistent as long as the utility function is
logarithmic.
APPENDIX
A.Proof that the maximized Hamiltonian in Section 3 is concave
in the state variable.
From (47) we get
f(k)  zk = v
0 1
( )
and hence zk = f(k)  v
0 1
( ). The maximized Hamiltonian is
H
m
= ln(k) + v[v
0 1
( )] +  [f(k)  v
0 1
( )]   k
which is concave in k.
B. Steady-state when government bonds exist
Let b(t) denote the stock of government bonds. A government bond is a
piece of paper that entitles its holder to earn the market interest rate r(t),
and to exchange it, whenever he wishes to, with a unit of capital. Initially
b(0) = 0. Let T (t) be the lump-sum transfer to workers. The government's
budget constraint is
_
b(t) +  (t)[r(t)k(t) + r(t)b(t)] = r(t)b(t) + T (t)
(The right-hand side is the government disbursements, and the left-hand side
is the government receipts, which consist of tax revenue and proceeds from
the sale of additional bonds). Let a(t)  k(t) + b(t) be the total wealth of
the representative capitalist. He is indierent between using his savings to
acquire additional government bonds and using them to build up his stock
of capital goods. His optimal consumption strategy must solve
max
c
Z
1
0
e
 t
ln(c)dt
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subject to
_a(t) = z(t)a(t)  c(t); a(t)  0,
and a(0) = a
0
= k
0
. This yields the optimal consumption rule
c(t) = a(t):
It follows that
_a(t) = [z(t)  ]a(t) = [z(t)  ][k(t) + b(t)]
The consumption of the representative worker is c
w
(t) = w(t) + T (t) =
f(k(t))   r(t)k(t) + T (t): Using the government budget constraint, we can
write
c
w
(t) = f(k(t))  z(t)[k(t) + b(t)] +
_
b(t)
Let x(t) 
_
b(t) be a control variable for the government. Adopting the
approach used in section 4, we can write the optimization problem for the
government as
max
Z
1
0
e
 t
fv(f(k)  z(k + b) + x) + ln[(k + b)]gdt
subject to
_
b = x
_
k = _a 
_
b = (z   )(k + b)  x
and k(0) = k
0
> 0, b(0) = 0.
The Hamiltonian is
H = v(f(k)  z(k + b) + x) + ln[(k + b)] +  
k
[(z   )(k + b)  x] +  
b
x
From this we obtain
@H
@z
= (k + b)[ 
k
  v
0
] = 0
@H
@x
= v
0
   
k
+  
b
= 0
_
 
k
=  
k
  (f
0
  z)v
0
 
1
k + b
+  
k
(z   )
_
 
b
=  
b
+ zv
0
 
1
k + b
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It is straightforward to show that at a steady state with
_
 
k
=
_
 
b
=
_
k =
_
b = 0,
we must have z =  = f
0
(k

); and b

is given by
v
0
(f(k

)  (k

+ b

)) =
1
(k

+ b

)
(50)
Thus, in the presence of government bonds, the optimal tax on capital income
is zero at the steady state. Notice that from (50), if  is suciently great,
then b

is negative, implying that the government is a net creditor. One can
consider, as an illustration, the following scenario: suppose that initially the
economy has the capital stock k(0) = k

where f
0
(k

) = ; and b(0) = 0.
Then the government imposes a tax  > 0 so that the after-tax income of
the representative capitalist is less than k

. Since the capitalist's optimal
consumption rule is c = k, to satisfy this consumption and to pay the income
tax, he must \eat up" part of his capital stock, if the government cannot be
a creditor. But since we allow b to be negative, the government can oer the
capitalist to pay part of the tax in the form of I.O.U.s, and there need not be
any fall in k. This means that part of the physical capital stock k becomes
eectively owned by the government. At a steady state with a negative b

,
even though the tax rate is zero, the government is able to make lump-sum
payments to the workers, nanced by the interest income it received from
the capitalists.
C. A discrete time formulation
In this Appendix, we show that the results of Section 2 can also be ob-
tained in a discrete time model. Capitalists maximize
1
X
t=0

t
u(c
t
) (51)
subject to
c
t
+ k
t+1
= (1  
t
)r
t
k
t
(52)
where r
t
is the gross rate of return, 0 <  < 1 is the discount factor, and k
0
is given. This gives the Euler equation
u
0
(c
t
) = u
0
(c
t+1
)(1  
t+1
)r
t+1
(53)
and the usual transversality condition. Workers consume
c
wt
= w
t
+ 
t
r
t
k
t
(54)
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The resource constraint is
c
t
+ c
wt
+ k
t+1
= F (k
t
) (55)
where F (k) is the gross output (i.e., output plus the depreciated stock of
capital). Multiply (52) by 
t
u
0
(c
t
), then sum from t = 0 to 1, and using
(53) and the transversality condition to get the implementability condition:
1
X
t=0

t
u
0
(c
t
)c
t
= u
0
(c
0
)(1  
0
)f
0
(k
0
)k
0
(56)
From (53) and (52),
c
t
+ k
t+1
=
k
t
u
0
(c
t 1
)
u
0
(c
t
)
(57)
The government seeks to maximize
1
X
t=0

t
[u(c
t
) + v(c
wt
)] (58)
subject to (55), (56) and (57). We form the Lagrangian and let 
t
, , and

t
be the Lagrange multipliers corresponding to (55), (56) and (57). Dif-
ferentiating the Lagrangian with respect to k
t+1
, c
t
, and c
wt
, we obtain the
following rst order conditions

t
  
t
= 
t+1
"
u
0
(c
t
)
u
0
(c
t+1
)
#
  
t+1
F
0
(k
t+1
) (59)

t
u
0
(c
t
) = 
t
[c
t
u
00
(c
t
) + u
0
(c
t
)]  
t
+ 
t
  
t
k
t
u
0
(c
t 1
)u
00
(c
t
)
 [u
0
(c
t
)]
2
+

t+1
k
t+1
u
00
(c
t+1
)
u
0
(c
t+2
)
(60)

t
v
0
(c
wt
) = 
t
(61)
Now let us consider a semi-stationary state. That is, we let c
t
= c,
c
wt
= c
w
and k
t
=

k. From (52), we then have

t

t
= 
0
= v
0
(c
wt
) (62)
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Notice that while 
t
=
t
is a constant, it is not true that 
t
=
t
must also be
a constant. Equation (59) yields, in a semi-stationary state, a rst order
dierence equation in the discounted multiplier 
t
=
t
:

t+1

t+1
 

t

t
= 
0
h
F
0
(

k)  1
i
(63)
From (60), in a semi-stationary state,
u
0
(c)  v
0
(c
wt
)  [cu
00
(c) + u
0
(c)]  =

t

t
"
1 +

ku
00
(c)
u
0
(c)
#
+

t+1

t+1
"

ku
00
(c)
u
0
(c)
#
(64)
Let us dene  by  = 1=(1+). Then, in a semi-stationary state, (57) yields
c = 

k: (65)
Then the right-hand side of (64) becomes
RHS =
"

t+1

t+1
 

t

t
# "

ku
00
(c)
u
0
(c)
#
 

t

t
"
1 
cu
00
(c)
u
0
(c)
#
=

0
h
F
0
(

k)  1
i
"

ku
00
(c)
u
0
(c)
#
 

t

t
"
1 
cu
00
(c)
u
0
(c)
#
(66)
Consider now the implication of imposing full stationarity, i.e., (
t
=
t
)  
(
t+1
=
t+1
) = 0. Then (63) gives
F
0
(

k) =
1

= 1 +  (67)
which determines

k, and the right-hand side of (64) becomes
RHS =  
0
"
1 
cu
00
(c)
u
0
(c)
#
(68)
Equation (64) becomes
u
0
(

k)  v
0
[F (

k) 

k(1 + )] = 
h


ku
00
(

k) + u(

k)
i
  
0
"
1 


ku
00
(

k)
u
0
(

k)
#
(69)
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However, if the function u(c) is logarithmic, then the right-hand side of
(69) becomes zero, and thus
u
0
(

k)  v
0
[F (

k) 

k(1 + )] = 0 (70)
But generically

k cannot satisfy both (67) and (70). It follows that in the
case where u(c) is logarithmic, a full stationary equilibrium does not exist,
and we can only have a semi-stationary equilibrium, with capital stock
b
k that
satises the following condition, obtained from (64), (65) and (66):
u
0
(

k)  v
0
[F (

k) 

k(1 + )] =  
0
h
F
0
(

k)  1
i
= =


h
1 +   F
0
(

k)
i
v
0
[f(

k) 

k(1 + )] (71)
From (71)  > F
0
(

k)   1 if and only if u
0
(

k) exceeds v
0
[F (

k)  

k(1 + )].
This result is analogous to the one reported at the end of section 2.
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